Category:Islamic Caliphate - Revision history

Ecb at 20:29, 6 June 2012

Ecb — Wed, 06 Jun 2012 20:29:35 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:29, 6 June 2012
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	is outwardly cool to the West, but it can usually work with Western nations		is outwardly cool to the West, but it can usually work with Western nations
	where its interests permit.		where its interests permit.
		+	==Rights==
		+	*SAIs are considered citizens.
		+	*LAIs and Bioroids are considered inferior.
		+	*Emergent AIs are considered wild animals.
		+	*Shadows, Fragments, Ghosts, Rogues, Xoxes, and any AI in a bioshell are considered abominations.
		+	*The creation of Bioroids is highly regulated.

Ecb at 12:02, 17 June 2010

Ecb — Thu, 17 Jun 2010 12:02:33 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:02, 17 June 2010
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-	~~[[Category:Great Powers]]~~
	[[Category:Multinational Alliances]]		[[Category:Multinational Alliances]]
	In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:		In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:

Ecb at 13:30, 14 June 2010

Ecb — Mon, 14 Jun 2010 13:30:29 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:30, 14 June 2010
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-	~~[[Category:Nations]]~~
	[[Category:Great Powers]]		[[Category:Great Powers]]
		+	[[Category:Multinational Alliances]]
	In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:		In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:
	city-dwellers against Bedouin, oil-wealthy nations against poor ones, Sunni		city-dwellers against Bedouin, oil-wealthy nations against poor ones, Sunni

Ecb at 12:47, 14 June 2010

Ecb — Mon, 14 Jun 2010 12:47:09 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:47, 14 June 2010
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		+	[[Category:Nations]]
	[[Category:Great Powers]]		[[Category:Great Powers]]
	In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:		In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:

Ecb at 00:10, 14 June 2010

Ecb — Mon, 14 Jun 2010 00:10:10 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:10, 14 June 2010
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	but it has done much to moderate Arab radicalism and promote Arab economic		but it has done much to moderate Arab radicalism and promote Arab economic
	development. Many powerful Islamic nations remain outside the alliance, particularly		development. Many powerful Islamic nations remain outside the alliance, particularly
-	Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab states of northern Africa. The Caliphate	+	[[Iran]], [[Pakistan]], and the Arab states of northern Africa. The Caliphate
	is outwardly cool to the West, but it can usually work with Western nations		is outwardly cool to the West, but it can usually work with Western nations
	where its interests permit.		where its interests permit.

Ecb: Created page with 'Category:Great Powers In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions: city-dwellers against Bedouin, oil-wealthy nations against poor ones, Sunni ag…'

Ecb — Mon, 14 Jun 2010 00:09:37 GMT

Created page with 'Category:Great Powers In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions: city-dwellers against Bedouin, oil-wealthy nations against poor ones, Sunni ag…'

New page

[[Category:Great Powers]]
In 2000, the Arab nations suffered from a variety of factional divisions:
city-dwellers against Bedouin, oil-wealthy nations against poor ones, Sunni
against Shi’ites, Western allies against anti-Western states. The contradictions
often limited Arab effectiveness in world affairs, as Arab states who were
nominally allied against the West came to blows among themselves. The Gulf
Wars of 1992 and 2013, the Egyptian-Libyan war of 2017, the constant struggle
against Israel . . . all of these sapped the strength of the Arab states.

To be effective in the modern world, Arab civilization needed unity. The
first promise of that unity came in the late 2030s, when a Muslim religious
leader named Ali al-Rashid attained prominence in Saudi Arabia. Al-Rashid’s
teachings seemed contradictory at first hearing. He preached devotion to the
puritanical Wahhabi sect, but also embraced science and technology as the
key to Arab success. He denounced the evil and degeneracy of Western civilization,
but also taught that the proper Arab response was to teach morality
by example.

Al-Rashid was blessed with great charisma and a fiery oratorical style that
won many converts. By 2040 he was the most prominent Sunni religious
leader in the world, openly acclaimed as the Mahdi by millions of Arabs. He
had no direct political power of his own, but in 2043 he made an alliance with
the House of Saud. The combination proved irresistible. Over the next few
years, the Saudis used al-Rashid’s influence to strengthen their formal partnerships
with other Muslim nations. During this period, they even managed a
reconciliation with the anti-monarchist regimes of Iraq and Syria. Soon the
Saudi alliance system took in all the Arab nations around the Persian Gulf.

In 2049, the allies agreed to set up a permanent council (the Presidium of
the Arab League) in the holy city of Medina. The new council would serve as
a focal point for the coordination of foreign policy and economic development.
Ali al-Rashid was named Chairman of the Presidium, a purely honorary
position which nonetheless gave him a unique position of moral influence.
Meanwhile, the House of Saud attained effective control of the new council
through typically pragmatic statesmanship.

The first action of the new Presidium was to grant Ali al-Rashid a long vacant
title: that of Caliph. This made him a recognized successor or agent of
Mohammed, and therefore the foremost religious and political leader in the
Muslim world. Finally, the Arab states had a rallying point for constructive
action in the world community, with the Caliph to provide moral leadership
and hard-headed Saudi statesmen to manage the everyday business.

Although Ali al-Rashid died in 2081, the Caliphate remains in existence
today. It has not always been successful in preventing strife among Muslims,
but it has done much to moderate Arab radicalism and promote Arab economic
development. Many powerful Islamic nations remain outside the alliance, particularly
Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab states of northern Africa. The Caliphate
is outwardly cool to the West, but it can usually work with Western nations
where its interests permit.